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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-2879 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
       
v. 
 
MARC GILL, 
                    Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cr-00151-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 15, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 2, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On August 14, 2009, Marc Gill pleaded guilty to one count of distributing 50 
grams or more of crack under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  The District Court accepted Gill’s plea 
pursuant to a written agreement, by which both Gill and the government agreed not to 
“seek or argue for any upward or downward departure or adjustment” and Gill waived his 
right to appeal any “sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls within 
or below the Guidelines range that results from the total Guidelines offense level of 34, if 
Marc Gill is determined to be a Career Offender.”  Gill reserved the right to appeal only 
“the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal history category.” 
 The Presentence Investigation Report found that Gill’s past convictions warranted 
career offender treatment and therefore calculated a total offense level of 34.  The PSR 
assigned 23 criminal history points, which corresponds to a criminal history category of 
VI, and noted that the guidelines sentence for a defendant with Gill’s offense level and 
criminal history category is 262 to 327 months. 
 At sentencing, in violation of his plea agreement, Gill argued for a “downward 
departure” for overrepresentation of his criminal history.  He also argued for a variance in 
view of then-pending legislation to reduce penalties for crack offenses.  The District 
Court found that Gill was “clearly a career offender under the guidelines,” and adopted 
the PSR’s guidelines calculation.  However, in view of the impending changes to the 
crack guidelines, the court did depart downward, imposing a sentence of 162 months.  
Gill subsequently moved, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate the sentence and to be 
resentenced in light of his counsel’s ineffectiveness in not appealing “the issue of over-
representation [of Gill’s] criminal history.”  The District Court granted leave to file a 
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nunc pro tunc direct appeal of Gill’s criminal history category computation.  This appeal 
followed. 
 Gill was entitled to challenge the District Court’s criminal history category 
determination, as provided in the plea agreement.  But Gill’s present challenge, advanced 
in a barely intelligible, eight-sentence “argument,” makes no mention of his criminal 
history category, and instead disputes the District Court’s criminal history points 
assignment.  Gill apparently contends that the District Court incorrectly assigned 23 
points, instead of 22.1 
 It is clear that Gill’s sentence of 162 months falls within the range of the waiver he 
agreed to.  “We do not review the merits of an appeal where we conclude (1) that the 
issues [the defendant] pursues on appeal fall within the scope of his appellate waiver and 
(2) that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, unless (3) enforcing 
the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.”2  Accordingly, for us to review the 
merits of his appeal, Gill must show that the purported error amounted to a “miscarriage 
of justice.”3 
                                              
1 We note that, in United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 425-26 (3d Cir. 2007), we 
held that in arguing that the sentencing court “overstated his criminal history,” a 
defendant in effect advocates for a downward departure.  Since the plea agreement 
explicitly precluded either party from arguing for a departure, Gill’s claim that his lawyer 
was ineffective in not challenging the purported “over-representation” of his criminal 
history would ordinarily be barred under Williams.  But because the government did not 
challenge the District Court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on this basis and 
does not brief the issue on appeal, our decision rests simply on the language of the 
waiver.   
2 United States v. Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
3 See United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 457-58 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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 Far from a miscarriage of justice, the District Court’s assignment of 23 criminal 
history points, instead of 22, had no effect whatsoever on the sentence imposed.  The 
District Court’s finding that Gill was a career offender triggered a total offense level of 
34.  The criminal history points became irrelevant.   
 In light of Gill’s waiver, we find no merit in this appeal and we will affirm the 
judgment of sentence of the district court.   
